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OHIO IS JONESING FOR AUTOMATIC LICENSE 
PLATE READERS: WHY THIS MAY VIOLATE YOUR 
FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND WHAT THE 
OHIO LEGISLATURE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 
MICHAEL E. FISHER* 
ABSTRACT 
The City of Cleveland currently owns and operates several automatic license 
plate recognition cameras. With a quick scan these cameras can provide law 
enforcement with locational and other personal data about an individual. The 
Supreme Court in United States v. Jones successfully avoided the issue of whether 
there is a privacy right in locational data; thus this Note addresses the need for Ohio 
legislation in order to balance the interests of law enforcement in using license plate 
data to apprehend criminals with citizens’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Note examines legislation in effect in other 
states regarding automatic license plate recognition systems and uses this legislation 
to propose recommendations for the Ohio Legislature.  
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I. THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY CLEVELAND’S RECENT ACQUISITION OF LICENSE PLATE 
READERS 
In 2012, the City of Cleveland purchased sixteen high-speed cameras to be used 
in automatic plate recognition systems.1 When mounted to a police vehicle that is 
driving at a high rate of speed, a single camera is capable of scanning 1,800 license 
plates per minute, recognizing license plates from all fifty states, and recording 
locational data for each plate scanned.2 This information is then stored in large 
databases and each individual license plate scan is checked to see if it matches the 
license plate of any stolen vehicle or any vehicle used in the commission of a crime.3 
If there is a match, the officer driving the police vehicle is notified instantly.4 In a 
perfect world, this instant feedback allows the officer to stop the car, identify the 
person driving the car as the person suspected of the crime in the database, and then 
apprehend the individual.5  
This instant identification creates a significant increase in the efficiency of police 
work. However, the efficiency comes at the expense of citizens’ constitutionally 
protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Such a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional, but for citizens in states without 
policies regarding the use of automatic license plate recognition systems, it may be 
the norm. The reason behind this result is that the use of automatic license plate 
recognition systems results in the collection of a massive amount of license plate 
scans that contain data concerning the daily travels of innocent, suspicionless 
citizens.6 Though the harm of a single scan may be miniscule, combining years’ 
worth of scans of a single license plate may paint a vivid picture of an innocent 
                                                           
 1  American Civil Liberties Union, Receipt for Public Records Request, City of Cleveland 
Dep’t of Law (Sept. 21, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ALPR/ohio/14632-
14733%20Cleveland.pdf. 
 2  Mobile Plate Hunter-900, ELSAG NORTH AMERICA, http://elsag.com/mobile.htm (last 
visited Jan. 13, 2016). 
 3  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, YOU ARE BEING TRACKED: HOW LICENSE PLATE READERS 
ARE BEING USED TO RECORD AMERICANS’ MOVEMENTS 5 (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/071613-aclu-alprreport-opt-v05.pdf. 
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  For the purpose of this Note and for reasons of brevity, I am not able to conduct an 
empirical study of all license plate scans in the United States. 
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person’s daily patterns and behaviors.7 Statistics reported by states that have adopted 
automatic license plate recognition systems demonstrate that fears of such Fourth 
Amendment intrusion are not off base. For example, in 2012, for every one-million 
license plates scanned in Maryland only forty-seven scans were potentially 
associated with “serious crimes.”8 Despite the fact that many states hover around 
Maryland’s dismal .0047% hit rate, many police departments still collect and store 
the data associated with these non-hit scans.9 The length of time such data is stored 
varies. Some states keep the data indefinitely,10 and some policies require deletion of 
non-hit data after five years.11 Such storage practices provide a great deal of 
locational data on innocent people that can be mined to determine their daily patterns 
and behaviors. 
This is a difficult problem to fix judicially because automatic license plate 
recognition technology is rapidly expanding, and therefore it presents virtually 
unprecedented challenges to the courts. A recent United States Supreme Court case 
displays the judicial system’s reluctance to decide whether individuals have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their locational data collected by technology 
similar to automatic license plate recognition systems. The novelty of the issues 
presented by modern technology combined with the Court’s judicial restraint results 
in unworkable tests, which demonstrates the need for legislative intervention. 
Unfortunately, many states and police departments have not adopted legislation or 
policies regarding the use of automatic license plate recognition systems, but instead 
employ this technology as soon as funding is available, leaving citizens unprotected 
against the intrusion of government into their private lives. 
This Note first explores the history and evolution of the Fourth Amendment, 
starting with the concerns of the Framers and then the transition from a property-
based inquiry to a reasonable expectation of privacy test for determining Fourth 
Amendment issues. Then this Note explains the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Jones and the its avoidance of the modern day issue as to whether there is a 
right to privacy in locational data. This Note then analyzes the concurring opinions 
in Jones, which explicitly call for legislation regarding this issue. Finally, this Note 
reviews automatic license plate recognition legislation in effect in other states and 
proposes recommendations for the Ohio Legislature. 
                                                           
 7  This is called the “mosaic theory.” For an overview of the mosaic theory, see Benjamin 
M. Ostrander, Note, The "Mosaic Theory" and Fourth Amendment Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1733 (2011). 
 8  AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 3, at 14. “Serious crimes” include stolen 
vehicles, wanted persons, violent gangs, terrorist organizations, or sex offenders.” Id. 
 9  See id. at 15. Rhinebeck, New York, in a three-month period scanned 99,771 license 
plates resulting in a .01% hit rate. Id. High Point, North Carolina, in an eleven-month period 
scanned 70,289 license plates resulting in a .08% hit rate. Id. Burbank, Illinois in a one-year 
period scanned 706,918 license plates resulting in a 0.3% hit rate. Id. 
 10  Id. at 20. 
 11  N.J. Att’y Gen., Directive No. 2010-5, Law Enforcement Directive Promulgating 
Attorney General Guidelines for the Use of Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) and 
Stored ALPR Data (Dec. 3, 2010), http://www.state.nj.us/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/Dir-
2010-5-LicensePlateReadersl-120310.pdf. 
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II. THE EVOLVING FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, adopted in March 
1792, reads, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.12 
The original intent of the Framers was to put an end to writs of assistance and 
general warrants that were used to forcibly enter colonists’ homes with little basis so 
the British could ransack their homes in search of libelous books.13 This is a far cry 
from concerns raised by privacy advocates today, such as the public outcry that led 
to the demise of the creation of a national automatic license plate recognition 
(“ALPR”) system in early 2014.14  
From the adoption of the Fourth Amendment until 1967, the Supreme Court 
treated Fourth Amendment issues as property-based inquiries that required trespass 
of a person’s personal property to trigger a Fourth Amendment violation.15 The 
Court departed from the trespass standard in 1967 in its landmark decision in Katz v. 
United States.16 In Katz, the defendant Charles Katz was charged with violating a 
federal law prohibiting the use of interstate communications for placing wagers and 
bets.17 Law enforcement agents witnessed Katz make numerous calls from a 
telephone booth, and afterwards the agents placed microphones on the outside of the 
booth to eavesdrop on Katz’s conversation.18 Using this information Katz was 
convicted in the district court, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.19 
The Supreme Court rejected the parties’ discussion of whether the telephone booth 
was a constitutionally protected area under the property-based trespass theory.20 
Instead, the Court adopted the reasonable expectation of privacy test and held that 
the defendant assumed his conversations were private because he sought to exclude 
                                                           
 12  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 13  William C. Koch, The Warrant Requirement, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 18-22 (John R. Vile & David L. Hudson, Jr., eds., 4th ed. 2013); see also United 
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). 
 14  See Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, Department of Homeland Security Cancels 
National License-Plate Tracking Plan, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/dhs-cancels-national-license-plate-
tracking-plan/2014/02/19/a4c3ef2e-99b4-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html. 
 15  John R. Vile, Trespass Actions, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 627-
28 (John R. Vile & Daniel L. Hudson, eds., 4th ed. 2013). 
 16  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 17  Id. at 348. 
 18  Id. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. at 351-53. 
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others when he entered the enclosed telephone booth.21 The Supreme Court 
concluded, “[t]he government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording 
the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while 
using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”22 
In 1983, the Supreme Court cited Katz when determining whether a defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy when traveling on a public road.23 In United 
States v. Knotts, the government placed a radio transmitter in a container of 
chloroform to track the movements of the vehicle holding the container.24 The radio 
transmitter data led the government to a remote cabin where a warranted search 
revealed a drug lab.25 The Court determined that no search occurred during the 
tracking of the vehicle because, “[a] person travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”26  
A year later, in United States v. Karo, the Court heard a case in which police 
placed a radio transmitter in a can of ether that allowed them to track the location of 
the defendant.27 The radio transmitter data led the government to a private residence 
where they executed a search warrant that led to the discovery of cocaine and drug 
manufacturing equipment.28 In accord with Katz and Knotts, the Court held that the 
locational data received while the radio transmitter was on public roads was 
constitutional because Karo did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while 
driving on the roads.29 However, the Court held that monitoring the device while in 
                                                           
 21  Id. at 353. 
 22  Id. 
 23  United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347 (1967)). In citing Katz, the Court relied heavily on a quote from Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979), in which the Court elaborated on the principles in Katz. See Knotts, 460 
U.S. at 480-81 (“Consistently with Katz, this Court uniformly has held that the application of 
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a 
‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded by 
government action. This inquiry, as Justice Harlan aptly noted in his Katz concurrence, 
normally embraces two discrete questions. The first is whether the individual, by his conduct, 
has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy’ . . . . The second question is 
whether the individual's subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable’ . . . .”) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)). 
 24  Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
 25  Id. at 279. 
 26  Id. at 281. The Court further observed, “[t]he governmental surveillance conducted by 
means of the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on 
public streets and highways. We have commented more than once on the diminished 
expectation of privacy in an automobile . . . .” Id. 
 27  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984). 
 28  Id. at 710. 
 29  Id. at 721. 
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the private residence was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.30 The Court 
distinguished Knotts in reaching the latter part of that holding because, in Knotts, the 
beeper was not monitored while inside a private residence;31 whereas in Karo the 
beeper was monitored inside a private residence.32 This was evidenced by the 
affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant explicitly stating that, 
“[u]sing the ‘beeper’ locator, I positively determined that the ‘beeper’ can . . . was 
now inside the above-described premises.”33 Until 2012, the Supreme Court was 
fairly consistent in its analysis of Fourth Amendment issues presented by cases with 
facts similar to the ones just described. 
A. United States v. Jones: The Application of Knotts and the Continuing Evolution 
In a 2012 Supreme Court case, United States v. Jones, the Court decided a 
modern Fourth Amendment issue similar to those in Katz and Knotts.34 In Jones, the 
defendant Antoine Jones was suspected of trafficking narcotics and was made the 
target of an investigation by a joint FBI and D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 
task force.35 Based on data gathered through the use of cameras outside the nightclub 
owned by Jones, visual surveillance, and wiretaps of his personal cellphone, the 
government applied for and was granted a warrant.36 The warrant authorized 
government agents to install a GPS device on Jones’s vehicle in the District of 
Columbia within ten days.37 However, agents did not install the GPS device until the 
eleventh day, in a parking lot in Maryland.38 Over the next twenty-eight days the 
GPS device yielded more than two-thousand pages of data.39 The data allowed the 
government to track Jones and ultimately obtain a multiple-count indictment 
charging Jones and several alleged co-conspirators with conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or 
more of cocaine base.40 
                                                           
 30  Id. at 714-15. “[In Knotts] [t]he Court held that since the movements of the automobile 
and the arrival of the can containing the beeper in the area of the cabin could have been 
observed by the naked eye, no Fourth Amendment violation was committed by monitoring the 
beeper during the trip to the cabin. In Knotts, the record did not show that the beeper was 
monitored while the can containing it was inside the cabin, and we therefore had no occasion 
to consider whether a constitutional violation would have occurred had the fact been 
otherwise.” Id. at 713-14. 
 31  Id. at 714. “In Knotts, the record did not show that the beeper was monitored while the 
can containing it was inside the cabin, and we therefore had no occasion to consider whether a 
constitutional violation would have occurred had the fact been otherwise.” Id. 
 32  Id. at 714. 
 33  Id. 
 34  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 35  Id. at 948. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id.  
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
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Before trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the GPS 
device.41 The district court granted the motion as it pertained to the data obtained 
while the vehicle was parked on Jones’s property, but the district court held that the 
data obtained through the GPS device while the vehicle was on public roads was 
admissible.42 In reaching this decision the district court relied on Supreme Court 
precedent in Knotts stating that, “[a] person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”43 Jones’s October trial resulted in a hung jury on the conspiracy 
count, but in March 2007 a grand jury charged Jones with the same conspiracy.44 
Using the same GPS data admitted in the first trial the jury returned a guilty verdict, 
and the district court sentenced Jones to life in prison.45 
Jones appealed the decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia reversed Jones’s conviction,46 holding that the evidence obtained by the 
warrantless use of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment, and therefore the 
admission of such evidence was improper.47 The D.C. Circuit denied the 
government's petition for rehearing en banc, with four judges dissenting, after which 
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.48  
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Jones Majority: Avoiding the Issue of Individuals’ Right to Privacy in Locational 
Data 
Legal scholars,49 privacy advocates,50 and even average citizens51 anticipated the 
Supreme Court’s review of the lower court’s decision in Jones because it appeared 
                                                           
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States v. 
Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. 
Ct. 945, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911 (2012)). 
 44  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
 45  Id. at 949. 
 46  Id.  
 47  Id.  
 48  Id. 
 49  See Jace C. Gatewood, It's Raining Katz and Jones: The Implications of United States 
v. Jones—A Case of Sound and Fury, 33 PACE L. REV. 683, 683-84 (2013). “The Jones case 
garnered widespread coverage across the nation, and became a polarizing topic of discussion 
especially among lawyers, judges, legal commentators, and law students. Even the average 
person on the street seemed to have an opinion regarding the authority of the government to 
secretly track the public movements of a person in everyday life.” Id. 
 50  Jessica Monaco, This Week in Civil Liberties, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION BLOG (July 1, 
2011), https://www.aclu.org/blog/week-civil-liberties.  
 51  See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Worries That New Technology Creates ‘1984’ 
Scenarios, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-
court-worries-that-new-technology-creates-1984 scenarios/2011/11/08/gIQAbHdw2M_story.html. 
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that the Supreme Court would finally reach a decision “regarding the authority of 
the government to secretly track the public movements of a person in everyday 
life.”52 However, this issue was not ultimately resolved in Jones. In fact, the 
Supreme Court nearly avoided the issue altogether by reverting to its property-based 
inquiry decisions from 1928 and 1942. 53 
In Jones, the government did not execute the warrant within the ten-day time 
frame (installing the device on the eleventh day) and did not adhere to the 
requirement that the GPS device be placed on the car in D.C. (device was placed on 
the car in Maryland); therefore, at the time the government placed the device on the 
car it did not have a valid warrant.54 Justice Scalia, in writing for the five-member 
majority, expressed no doubt that a vehicle was an “effect” under the language of the 
Fourth Amendment55 or that the placing of the device on the car was considered a 
“search.”56 
The government cited Katz in its argument that that no search occurred since 
Jones had no “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the area of the vehicle accessed 
by government agents and in the locations of the vehicle on the public roads since 
they were visible to the public.57 Nevertheless, Justice Scalia thought it was more 
significant that the government had trespassed on Jones’s property when installing 
the device.58 In so holding, the five-member majority avoided deciding the much 
larger issue of whether Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy was violated by the 
long-term use of the GPS tracking device to monitor the movements of his vehicle. 
Under the majority reasoning in Jones, if it were technologically possible to track 
a person using a GPS-type device without physically trespassing on that person’s 
property, the government would not need a warrant to monitor that person’s daily 
whereabouts. This issue is important because this technology exists in many forms, 
especially in automatic license plate recognition systems. The automatic license plate 
recognition systems make it possible for the government to monitor people in ways 
that are as invasive as the aforementioned cases while still managing to avoid a 
physical trespass. Thus, automatic license plate recognition technology enables the 
government to perform an end run around the property-based inquiry reverted to by 
Justice Scalia. For this reason, it is easy to see why this decision disappointed those 
                                                           
 52  Gatewood, supra note 49, at 683-84. 
 53  See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; see also id. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing 
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 138 (1942); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 471 (1928)). 
 54  Id. at 948 n.1 (majority opinion). 
 55  U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their . . . effects, 
against unreasonable searches . . . .”). 
 56  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 57 Id. at 950.   
 58  Id. at 949. (“It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case: The 
Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining information. 
We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss2/11
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who anticipated the lasting impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that Jones 
could have had.59 
B. Jones Concurrence 
In keeping with Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas’s originalist approach to 
constitutional interpretation, the majority opinion departed from the reasonable 
expectations test set out in Katz in favor of eighteenth-century tort law principles 
supporting an action for trespass to chattels.60 While four of the Justices concurred 
with the Court’s holding to exclude the evidence, they disagreed with the majority’s 
approach to such a modern technology case.61 One of the main reasons the 
concurring Justices disagreed with this departure from the Katz test was because the 
majority opinion and use of precedent did not deal with cases in which the 
government relied on electronic tracking that did not involve a trespass.62  
The concurring Justices’ logic in Jones is not unprecedented in Fourth 
Amendment cases. Goldman v. United States and Olmstead v. United States from 
1942 and 1928 produced dissenting opinions attempting to address the issue of 
technological advancements under the Fourth Amendment.63 In Goldman, Justice 
Murphy, in a dissenting opinion, argued that new technology made invasions of 
privacy possible that did not require a physical trespass but they were still every bit 
as offensive to the Fourth Amendment as a trespass.64 Justice Brandeis, in Olmstead, 
argued that the Fourth Amendment language should be broadly interpreted and 
applicable to modern issues.65 The concurring Justices’ reasoning in Jones was no 
different. 
                                                           
 59  Gatewood, supra note 49, at 683 (“Reading the highly anticipated decision of United 
States v. Jones . . . was much like waking up Christmas morning only to find out that you did 
not get everything on your Christmas list. Santa not only did not bring you everything on your 
list, but also forgot all the good stuff. So, all of the excitement and anticipation of the moment 
yields way to ‘Bah! Humbug!’ feelings, and the long awaited moment becomes merely a 
footnote in annals of Christmases past.”). 
 60  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. “At common law, a suit for trespass to chattels required 
merely a violation of ‘the dignitary interest in the inviolability of chattels,’ but today there 
must be ‘some actual damage to the chattel before the action can be maintained.’” Id. at 957 
n.2 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER & 
KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 87 (5th ed. 1984)). In Jones, no damage was done to Jones’s 
vehicle when the tracking device was attached. Id. 
 61  See id. 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 62  Id. at 961-62. 
 63  See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 138 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 64  Goldman, 316 U.S. at 139. (“[S]cience has brought forth far more effective devices for 
the invasion of a person's privacy than the direct and obvious methods of oppression which 
were detested by our forebears and which inspired the Fourth Amendment. Surely the spirit 
motivating the framers of that Amendment would abhor these new devices no less. Physical 
entry may be wholly immaterial.”). 
 65  Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74. (“Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading 
privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it 
possible for the government, by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to 
obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet. Moreover, ‘in the application of a 
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338 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:329 
 
In concurring, Justice Alito wrote, “[r]ecent years have seen the emergence of 
many new devices that permit the monitoring of a person's movements,” and “[a] 
legislative body is well situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed 
lines, and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”66 He then 
went on to say that, in the absence of congressional legislation on this matter, courts 
are bound to decide these issues under the current Fourth Amendment doctrine and 
“ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of 
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”67 Under this 
approach, the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
would intrude on a reasonable person’s expectation of privacy.68 
Justice Sotomayor filed a separate concurrence in which she disagreed with 
Justice Alito that the physical intrusion element is completely irrelevant;69 however, 
she did recognize that physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of 
surveillance and that long-term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses 
intrudes on expectations of privacy.70 Prior to the Court’s decision in Jones, many 
cities, including Cleveland, already had adopted surveillance technologies of the 
kind that Justice Sotomayor warned the Court about.71  
IV. A CALL FOR LEGISLATION 
Constitutional interpretation in light of rapidly advancing technology produces 
unworkable tests and avoids answering critical privacy issues.72 This dilemma was 
noted in both concurring opinions in Jones. Justice Alito wrote, “[i]n circumstances 
involving dramatic technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may 
                                                           
Constitution, our contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.’ The 
progress of science in furnishing the government with means of espionage is not likely to stop 
with wire tapping.”) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). 
 66  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 67  Id. at 964. 
 68  Id. 
 69  See id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Justice Alito's approach, which discounts 
altogether the constitutional relevance of the Government's physical intrusion on Jones' Jeep, 
erodes that longstanding protection for privacy expectations inherent in items of property that 
people possess or control. By contrast, the trespassory test applied in the majority's opinion 
reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government physically invades 
personal property to gather information, a search occurs. The reaffirmation of that principle 
suffices to decide this case.”). 
 70  Id. (“[A]s Justice Alito notes, physical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of 
surveillance. With increasing regularity, the Government will be capable of duplicating the 
monitoring undertaken in this case by enlisting factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking 
devices or GPS-enabled smartphones . . . . In cases involving even short-term monitoring, 
some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular 
attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person's public 
movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, 
and sexual associations.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 71  See supra Part I. 
 72  See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06 (2004). 
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be legislative.”73 He then, almost reluctantly, explains that in light of the fact that 
Congress has not enacted any legislation regulating the use of GPS-tracking 
technology for law enforcement purposes, “[t]he best that we can do . . . is to apply 
existing Fourth Amendment doctrine . . . .”74 Justice Sotomayor also seemed hesitant 
in light of the fact that there is no congressional oversight into this matter. In her 
concurring opinion she states, “I would also consider the appropriateness of 
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate 
branch, a tool so amenable to misuse . . . .”75 At the end of the majority opinion, 
Justice Scalia notes that surveillance, which does not intrude on a citizen’s property, 
could potentially be unconstitutional but that the facts in Jones did not require the 
Court to resolve this issue yet.76 One can only imagine that Justice Scalia, exercising 
his judicial restraint, felt these problems were better left to the legislature if they are 
to be resolved anytime soon. Likewise, both concurring opinions are a call for 
legislation regarding these matters.  
The importance of this issue is apparent when looking at two bills introduced in 
Congress. Despite the fact that the bills do not directly address the issue of automatic 
license plate recognition systems, the issue of locational privacy is on the minds of 
some legislators. On June 15 and 16, 2011, just five months before oral arguments in 
Jones and seven months before the Jones decision, two bills seeking to regulate GPS 
surveillance were introduced in Congress. The Geolocational Privacy and 
Surveillance Act sought to amend title 18 of the United States Code to specify the 
circumstances in which a person may acquire geolocation information.77 Under this 
Act, “geolocation information” is defined as:  
[A]ny information . . . concerning the location of a wireless 
communication device or tracking device . . . that, in whole or in part, is 
generated by or derived from the operation of that device and that could 
be used to determine or infer information regarding the location of the 
person.78  
                                                           
 73  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Kerr, supra note 72, at 805-06). 
 74  Id. For two separate interpretations of Justice Alito’s “[t]he best we can do” language, 
see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 351 
n.233 (2012). On the one hand, Professor Kerr says that this language reflects the 
constitutional avoidance doctrine and on the other hand that the language evinces a 
combination of judicial application of the mosaic theory by the judiciary along with 
congressional oversight. Because Jones involved federal agents that likely would not have 
been bound by state statute Kerr seems to think this interpretation is stronger, see id. at 351-
52, but for the purpose of introducing other state legislation and advocating a call to the Ohio 
General Assembly in light of State v. Johnson, 22 N.E.3d 1061 (Ohio 2014), I have only 
discussed the former constitutional avoidance interpretation.  
 75  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 76  Id. at 954 (majority opinion) (“We may have to grapple with these ‘vexing problems’ in 
some future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had to 
Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to resolve them here.”). 
 77  Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act, S. 1212, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 78  Id. § 2. 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
340 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:329 
 
This would appear to cover the device that was physically attached to the vehicle 
in Jones but would not prohibit the type of tracking accomplished by automatic 
license plate recognition systems. Moreover, the Location Privacy Protection Act of 
2012 sought to address voluntary location tracking of electronic communications 
devices.79 Similar to the other Bill, the Location Privacy Act of 2012 does not 
directly address automatic license plate recognition systems but defines the 
prohibited device as one that is “designed or intended to be carried by or on the 
person of an individual or travel with the individual, including, but not limited to, a 
vehicle the individual drives.”80 This language appears to address physically attached 
devices such as the one used in Jones, but would not appear to address automatic 
license plate recognition systems since those are not carried or attached to a vehicle. 
Nevertheless, these Bills provide insight into the minds of some legislators despite 
the fact that neither Bill was passed in this form.81 
The Locational Privacy Act of 2012 was resubmitted on March 17, 2014, and is 
still under consideration.82 In its current form the Bill differs from the original in that 
it defines the prohibited device as one “commonly carried by or on the person . . . or 
commonly travels with the individual, including in or as part of a vehicle the 
individual drives.”83 This does not appear to limit the device to one that is designed 
or intended to be carried, or to one that is attached to a person or vehicle, as in the 
previous version, and actually expands the number of devices that are covered.84 The 
fact that this Bill was amended two years later to expand the type devices covered 
represents the rapidly evolving technology that must be regulated.85 Even if this Bill 
were to pass it does not appear to regulate technologies, such as the automatic 
license plate recognition systems, that many cities, including Cleveland, have 
already adopted.86 
V. WHY THIS ISSUE MATTERS TO OHIO CITIZENS 
This issue matters to Ohio citizens because automatic license plate recognition 
technology has been implemented in Ohio cities and Ohio courts have recently faced 
Fourth Amendment issues caused by locational data privacy. In March 2014, the 
Ohio Supreme Court was faced with substantially similar facts and issues presented 
in Jones.87 The case was an appeal from a 2010 conviction decided prior to the 
                                                           
 79  See Location Privacy Protection Act of 2011, S. 1223, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 80  Id. § 3. 
 81  See Location Privacy Protection Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2171 (last visited Dec. 6, 2015) [hereinafter 
GOVTRACK S. 2171]; Geolocations Privacy and Surveillance Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s1212/text (last visited Dec. 6, 2015).  
 82  GOVTRACK S. 2171, supra note 81. 
 83  Location Privacy Protection Act of 2014, S. 2171, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014) 
(reintroduced from a previous session of Congress). 
 84  See id. 
 85  See discussion supra Part I. 
 86  See discussion supra Part I. 
 87  See State v. Johnson, 22 N.E.3d 1061 (Ohio 2014). 
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ruling in Jones.88 In this case, a County Sheriff’s Deputy from Butler, Ohio, acting 
without a warrant, attached a GPS tracking device to the defendant’s vehicle while it 
was parked on the street across from his home in October 2008.89 The deputies 
tracked the defendant’s van for five days, culminating in a traffic stop conducted at 
gunpoint.90 No drugs were found in the defendant’s vehicle, but drugs were found in 
his associate’s vehicle, which had also been stopped.91 At trial the defendant’s 
motion to suppress the GPS evidence was denied and he was sentenced to fifteen 
years in prison.92 The Twelfth District Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of his 
motion to suppress holding that the placement of the GPS device on his vehicle was 
not a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.93 In March 2012, the Ohio 
Supreme Court accepted the defendant’s appeal and vacated the District Court of 
Appeals’ judgment and remanded to the trial court for the application of Jones.94 On 
remand, the trial court found that placing the GPS tracking device on the defendant’s 
van violated the Fourth Amendment but declined to suppress the evidence based on 
the “good-faith” exception to exclusionary rule.95 The defendant was sentenced to 
ten years in prison.96 The Twelfth District affirmed the trial court’s decision, and in 
November 2014 the Ohio Supreme Court granted review.97 The Ohio Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction on the reasoning that the deputies acted with a good faith 
and objectively reasonable belief that the search would not violate defendant’s 
Fourth Amendment rights based on the state of the law in October 2008.98 
                                                           
 88  Id. at 1064. 
 89  Id. at 1063. 
 90  Id. 
 91  Id.  
 92  Id. at 1063-64. 
 93  Id. at 1064. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id.  
 96  Id.  
 97   Id. at 1065. 
 98  Id. at 1070. (“In the aftermath of Jones, police officers can no longer harbor a good-
faith belief that attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle is not a search for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment. Nonetheless, at the time Detective Hackney attached the GPS device 
to Johnson's van, he acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that his actions 
comported with the Fourth Amendment.”). In acting on this state of the law belief in October 
2008 the court relied on two cases cited above and stated, “when Detective Hackney attached 
a GPS tracking device to Johnson's van, two cases from the United States Supreme Court—
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 
(1984)—supported Hackney's objectively reasonable belief that attaching a tracking device to 
a vehicle did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy that Johnson had, either in the 
undercarriage of his van or in his whereabouts while driving on public streets and highways.” 
Id. at 1062.  
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This Ohio case and the “state of the law in October 2008” reasoning is a 
microcosm of the much larger problem: absent legislative regulation of rapidly 
evolving surveillance technologies, law enforcement agencies that adopt them will 
be able to remain one step ahead of a judicial system that seems to be approaching 
such issues at a snail’s pace. The Jones approach does not reach the issues facing our 
modern society, especially issues that Ohio faces in light of Cleveland’s purchase of 
sixteen new automatic license plate recognition systems.99 Therefore, much like the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones, this recent Ohio decision also avoids reaching 
crucial issues and further clarifies the need for legislative intervention. 
A. It is Not Just Ohio 
Responses to a document request under the Freedom of Information Act by the 
American Civil Liberties Union revealed the existence of a national license plate 
scanning database being built by the Department of Justice.100 The initial scope of 
the project was aimed at combatting drug trafficking by drug cartels near the 
border.101 Suspiciously, this does not explain the use of automatic license plate 
recognition cameras in New Jersey;102 however, a brief look at New Jersey’s 
guidelines for automatic license plate reader cameras reveals policies in favor of 
automatic license plate recognition systems and may provide an explanation as to 
why the Department of Justice has deployed cameras in New Jersey.103 Since then, it 
appears that other state law enforcement agencies are accessing the database for 
assistance with their own ongoing investigations. The prevalence of these automatic 
license plate recognition systems highlights the urgency for legislation in these areas. 
The following sections provide an overview of states that currently have legislation 
or procedures in place to deal with the automatic license plate recognition issues. 
VI. SOLVING THE AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE SCANNING ISSUE AT THE STATE LEVEL 
Eight states have responded to the locational privacy issues raised by automatic 
license plate recognition systems by enacting legislation or issuing administrative 
opinions regarding the use of such systems.104 The legislation at the state level 
ranges from significantly restricting the use of automatic license plate recognition 
systems,105 to greatly expanding their use.106 Exploring the legislation from these 
                                                           
 99  See discussion supra Part I. 
 100  American Civil Liberties Union, DEA National License Plate Recognition Program, 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Pages%20from%2030890-30907%202013.08.28%20-
%20DEA%20Response.pdf (last visited Dec. 6, 2015). 
 101  See id. 
 102  Id. 
 103  See discussion infra Part IV.D. Out of the state legislation and guidelines reviewed in 
this Note, New Jersey’s policies are the most in favor of the use of automatic license plate 
recognition systems. 
 104  ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1803 (West 2015); CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413 (West 2015); ME. 
REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b (2015); N.J. Att’y 
Gen., Directive No. 2010-5, supra note 11; UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2003 (West 2015); Va. 
Att’y Gen., Legality of Collection from Automated License Plate Reader, 2013 WL 653025, 
at *4 (Feb. 13, 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607 (West 2015);. 
 105  See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b (2015). 
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states paves the way for Ohio to adopt similar legislation that strikes a balance 
between protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights while still allowing law 
enforcement agencies utilizing the automatic license plate recognition systems to 
apprehend criminals. 
A. Maine, New Hampshire, and California Enact Strict Legislation for Automatic 
License Plate Recognition Systems 
Maine and New Hampshire have enacted the most restrictive automatic license 
plate recognition system legislation out of the eight states that have addressed this 
issue.107 The New Hampshire State Highway Law prohibits all use of automatic 
license plate recognition cameras as well as other devices capable of “determining 
the ownership of a motor vehicle or the identity of a motor vehicle's occupants on 
the public ways of the state.”108 There are a few narrow exceptions carved out that 
allow camera use if it is undertaken for purposes of operation of a toll collection 
system,109 to assist in securing three named bridges in Portsmouth,110 and when the 
surveillance is incidental to the monitoring of a building or other structure under the 
control of the state.111 This law further prohibits the State of New Hampshire and its 
political subdivisions from obtaining any information from outside sources that it 
would not be able to obtain itself under the exceptions just mentioned.112 This means 
that the law enforcement agencies in New Hampshire may only access other 
automatic license plate recognition databases if the scans fall into one of the narrow 
exceptions mentioned above. 
Maine’s legislation prohibits private use of automatic license plate recognition 
cameras and requires law enforcement to delete stored license plate data that is not 
part of a criminal investigation within twenty-one days.113 This is three days shorter 
than New Hampshire’s twenty-four day time limit for storing license plate data.114 
Similar to New Hampshire’s statute, Maine’s statute exempts the turnpike authority 
or a law enforcement agency using the cameras for toll enforcement purposes. 115 
                                                           
 106  See, e.g., N.J. Att’y Gen., Directive No. 2010-5, supra note 11. 
 107  See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:75-b (2015) (prohibiting, with limited exceptions, the 
use of automated number plate scanning devices); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A (2015) 
(also prohibiting, with limited exceptions, the use of automated number plate scanning 
devices). 
 108  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130(I) (2015). 
 109  Id. § 236:130(III)(e). 
 110  Id. § 236:130(III)(f). 
 111  Id. § 236:130(III)(g). 
 112  Id. § 236:131 (“Neither the state of New Hampshire nor its political subdivisions shall 
obtain from others, including private businesses and federal and state governments, any 
information that it is prohibited from obtaining under the provisions of RSA 236:130.”). 
 113  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A(5) (2015). 
 114  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 236:130(III)(g) (2015). 
 115  ME. REV. STAT. tit. 29-A, § 2117-A(1) (2015). 
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The California legislature has also placed fairly strict limitations on the 
California Highway Patrol’s use of automatic license plate recognition cameras.116 
The California Vehicle Code states that “[t]he Department of the California Highway 
Patrol may retain license plate data captured by a license plate reader (LPR) for no 
more than 60 days, except in circumstances when the data is being used as evidence 
or for all felonies being investigated . . . .”117 Furthermore, the California Vehicle 
Code prohibits the California Highway Patrol from selling automatic license plate 
recognition data, and it also prohibits sharing of the data with an agency that is not a 
law enforcement agency or an individual who is not a law enforcement officer.118 
California’s legislation requires that the California Highway Patrol to monitor 
internal use of the data to prevent unauthorized use.119 In addition to this 
requirement, the California Highway Patrol is required to report the plate scanner 
practices and usage, which includes the number of data disclosures, a record of the 
agencies to which data was disclosed, for what purpose the data was disclosed, and 
any changes in policy that affect privacy concerns.120  
Strict regulation of the kind imposed by Maine, New Hampshire, and California 
provide bright line rules as to what is and what is not permitted when it comes to 
using automatic license plate recognition systems. However, these bright line tests 
may come at the expense of law enforcement efficiency. The remaining states appear 
to have attempted to balance the law enforcement needs with that of protecting 
citizens’ rights by enacting slightly less restrictive rules regarding automatic license 
plate recognition use. 
B. Using Less Strict Legislation to Balance Automatic License Plate Recognition 
Use and Citizens’ Rights 
Additional states have enacted less restrictive legislation regarding the use of 
automatic license plate recognition systems in an attempt to strike a balance between 
apprehending criminals and protecting citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights. Enacted 
in 2013, an Arkansas statute prohibits the use of automatic license plate recognition 
cameras by public and private agencies.121 The statutory exceptions allow automatic 
license plate recognition cameras to be used by law enforcement for the purposes of 
an ongoing investigation, by parking enforcement entities for regulating the use of 
parking facilities, or for the purpose of controlling access to secured areas.122 
Furthermore, Arkansas requires captured license plate data that is not part of an 
ongoing investigation be deleted within 150 days and prohibits all sharing of the data 
with other law enforcement agencies unless the captured data indicates evidence of 
an offense.123  
                                                           
 116  See CAL. VEH. CODE § 2413 (West 2015). 
 117  Id. § 2413(b). 
 118  Id. § 2413(c). 
 119  Id. § 2413(d). 
 120  Id. § 2413(e). 
 121  ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1803 (West 2015). 
 122  Id. § 12-12-1803(b). 
 123  Id. § 12-12-1804(a). 
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Unique to the Arkansas statute is the requirement that any entity that uses an 
automatic license plate recognition system allowed under the statute is required to 
compile statistical data every six months into a format sufficient to allow the general 
public to review the data.124 The report must include data representing the number of 
license plates scanned and the names of the lists against which captured plate data 
were checked.125 In addition to this information, for each check of captured license 
plate data against one of the aforementioned lists the data must also include the 
number of confirmed matches, the number of matches that upon further investigation 
did not correlate to an alert, and the number of matches that resulted in arrest and 
prosecution.126 Law enforcement agencies required to comply with this rule may find 
it discouraging and cumbersome, however, it is beneficial to both the agency and the 
general public nonetheless. Although it may require more work on the part of the 
agency, it will provide the agency with a significant amount of data regarding the 
return on investment of these expensive automatic license plate recognition systems. 
The disclosure of such data to the general public also promotes transparency and 
may greatly reduce the public’s fear of an Orwellian society.127 
Legislation passed in Utah, using similar language as that of Arkansas, also 
prohibits the use of automatic license plate recognition cameras, but provides 
exceptions that are slightly broader than those in the Arkansas statute.128 For 
instance, both Arkansas and Utah allow law enforcement officers to use license plate 
scanners for the purposes of an ongoing investigation, and both states allow parking 
enforcement entities to use license plate scanners for the purpose of controlling 
access to secured areas. However, Utah also makes exceptions for the purpose of 
collecting an electronic toll, for the purpose of enforcing motor carrier laws, and by a 
public transit district for the purpose of assessing parking needs and conducting a 
travel pattern analysis.129 Unlike in Arkansas, government entities in Utah using 
license plate scanners are not required to compile statistical data130 and must delete 
scan data within nine months.131 The time limit is shortened to thirty days if the data 
is stored by private entities.132 
                                                           
 124  Id. § 12-12-1805(a)(1). 
 125  Id. § 12-12-1805(b)(1), (2). 
 126  Id. § 12-12-1805(b)(3). 
 127  Orwell warned of the dangers of mass surveillance through the use of telescreens, 
which subject citizens to constant surveillance. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN 
EIGHTY-FOUR (Signet Classic 1961) (1949). Justice Breyer invoked 1984 in oral argument to 
describe the dangers of modern surveillance: “no one, at least very rarely, sends human beings 
to follow people twenty-four hours a day. That occasionally happens. But with the machines, 
you can. So if you win, you suddenly produce what sounds like 1984.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 13, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (No. 10-1259), 2011 WL 
5360051. 
 128  See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-2003 (West 2015). 
 129  Id. § 41-6a-2003(2). 
 130  Id. §§ 41-6a-2004(2)(a)-(c). 
 131  Id. § 41-6a-2004(1)(c). 
 132  Id. § 41-6a-2005(4)(b). 
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Vermont legislation requires law enforcement agencies to delete automatic 
license plate recognition data after eighteen months, it clearly defines who can have 
access to the data, it defines what circumstances allow a person to access the data, 
and it requires annual reporting on the use of automatic license plate recognition 
cameras and data requests.133 The reporting and oversight required by the statute 
mandates that the Department of Public Safety establish a review process to ensure 
that information obtained through use of automatic license plate recognition cameras 
complies with the statute.134 The Department of Public Safety is then required to 
report the results of this review annually to the Vermont Senate and House 
Committee on Judiciary and on Transportation.135 The content requirements for these 
reports are similar to the requirements in the Arkansas and California statutes.136  
Vermont differs from the other states because its law authorizes a centralized 
database operated by the Vermont Justice Information Sharing System of the 
Department of Public Safety.137 Prior to the enactment of the statute the ACLU of 
Vermont reported that police departments in all parts of the state were using 
automatic license plate recognition systems, and that the data was being uploaded to 
a centralized computer database and retained for four years.138 Authorizing the use of 
a centralized database that shares historical data with both in-state and out-of-state 
law enforcement agencies provides advantages to law enforcement agencies, but the 
potential to abuse such large databases discussed earlier is still present.139 For this 
reason, Vermont has more than cut the storage time in half.140 Tinkering with the 
storage time, statistical reporting requirements, and other requirements are ways that 
states have attempted to balance law enforcement concerns while protecting citizen’s 
rights; however, not every state has attempted to strike such a balance. 
C. New Jersey Directive Encourages Widespread Automatic License Plate 
Recognition System Use 
New Jersey’s approach is vastly different from the previous statutes. In 2010, the 
New Jersey Attorney General issued a law enforcement directive promulgating 
guidelines for the use of automatic license plate recognition cameras.141 The 
                                                           
 133  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607 (West 2015). 
 134  Id. § 1607(e). 
 135  Id. 
 136  See id. 
 137  Id. § 1607(a)(3). The definition section of the statute splits collected data into two 
categories. The first, or “Active Data,” is basically license plate scans that are checked against 
hot lists. See id. § 1607(a)(1). “Historical Data,” though, is defined as data collected and 
“stored on the statewide ALPR server.” Id. § 1607(a)(3) (emphasis added). This statewide 
server language demonstrates how the Vermont Legislature has authorized the use of a 
statewide database to facilitate automatic license plate recognition data sharing between local 
and state agencies. 
 138  AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 3, at 22. 
 139  See id. at 31. 
 140  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1607(d)(2) (West 2015). 
 141  See N.J. Att’y Gen., Directive No. 2010-5, supra note 11. 
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directive admits, “that our experience with this new and evolving technology is 
limited,” and purports to restrict the use of automatic license plate recognition 
cameras for “legitimate law enforcement business.”142 What is drastically different 
from the statutes previously discussed is that this directive requires that the license 
plate data be stored for a period of five years, and only allows an agency to delete 
the data before the five-year period if the data has been transferred to the State Police 
Regional Operations Intelligence Center or any other system that aggregates and 
stores data collected by two or more law enforcement agencies in accordance with 
the provisions set out in the directive.143 In addition to explicitly authorizing a 
central database, the directive also explicitly authorizes the sort of data-mining that 
Justice Sotomayor expressed concern about in her concurring opinion in Jones.144 
Under this directive, the data mining is termed “Crime Trend Analysis,” which 
contemplates the use of computer programs to piece together individual scans to 
track patterns of behavior.145 The directive does not seem to consider the abuse of 
such data mining and automatic license plate recognition surveillance practices that 
have already occurred in major cities around the world.146 While the New Jersey 
                                                           
 142  Id. at 2. Exactly what is meant by “legitimate law enforcement business” is unclear but 
a list of examples expands the definition to include “persons wanted by a law enforcement 
agency who are of interest in a specific investigation, whether or not such persons are 
themselves suspected of criminal activity.” Id. at 7 (emphasis added). 
 143  Id.   
 144  Id. at 11. Justice Sotomayor warned that, “[t]he Government can store such records and 
efficiently mine them for information years into the future . . . And because GPS monitoring is 
cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds 
surreptitiously, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: 
‘limited police resources and community hostility.’” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
955-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Illinois v. 
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004)). 
 145  N.J. Att’y Gen., Directive No. 2010-5, supra note 11, at 4 (“‘Crime trend analysis’ 
refers to the analytical process by which stored automatic license plate recognition data is 
used, whether alone or in conjunction with other sources of information, to detect crime 
patterns by studying and linking common elements of recurring crimes; to predict when and 
where future crimes may occur; and to link specific vehicles to potential criminal or terrorist 
activity. The term includes an automated process in which a computer program analyzes 
stored data to identify potentially suspicious activity or other anomalies involving one or more 
scanned vehicles and where such automated analysis is done without disclosing personal 
identifying information about any individual to an authorized user or any other person except 
as may be authorized . . . .”). 
 146  See, e.g., Adam Goldman & Matt Apuzzo, With Cameras, Informants, NYPD Eyed 
Mosques, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 23, 2012), http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-
News/2012/Newark-mayor-seeks-probe-of-NYPD-Muslim-spying (describing how New York 
City police officers reportedly drove unmarked vehicles equipped with automatic license plate 
recognition cameras around local mosques to record each mosque attendee); Paul Lewis, 
CCTV Aimed at Muslim Areas in Birmingham to be Dismantled, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/25/birmingham-cctv-muslim-areas-
surveillance (reporting on more than two hundred automatic license plate recognition systems 
installed in Muslim suburbs of Birmingham as part of a counterterrorism initiative, but after 
an investigation by a British newspaper revealed that police had misled residents into 
believing the cameras were to be used to combat vehicle crime and antisocial behavior, public 
outrage was so great that the program was cancelled). 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2016
348 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:329 
 
directive strikes a bright line rule regarding automatic license plate recognition 
system use, it does so at the cost of citizens’ rights. 
D. Virginia’s Legislation: the “Active” Versus “Passive” Automatic License Plate 
Recognition Use Distinction 
The Virginia Attorney General’s advisory opinion to the Virginia Department of 
State Police establishes a different approach to automatic license plate recognition 
system regulation that may be more effective at balancing the competing interests of 
law enforcement and citizens than the legislation previously discussed. The advisory 
opinion concludes that the State’s Government Data Collection and Dissemination 
Practices Act prohibits state law enforcement’s use of automatic license plate 
recognition cameras for “passive” data collection, but allows their use for “active” 
data collection.147 “Active” collection is when law enforcement collects, evaluates, 
and analyzes the license plate data in real time to determine the relevance to an 
ongoing case or emergency. Alternatively, “passive” collection is when law 
enforcement collects unanalyzed data for potential future use investigating criminal 
or terroristic activities.148 Essentially, “passive” collection is collecting and pooling 
the license plate information of every car that passes by the automatic license plate 
recognition cameras.149 Despite the fact that this is an advisory opinion analyzing 
how automatic license plate recognition cameras fit into current Virginia law, which 
does not address automatic license plate recognition cameras, it provides a decent 
framework for potential Ohio legislation regarding automatic license plate 
recognition systems.  
E. Recommendations for the Ohio Legislature Regarding Automatic License Plate 
Recognition System Regulation 
Ohio should look to the other legislation of other states as a guide regarding its 
own legislation on automatic license plate recognition system regulation. Ohio’s 
legislation on automatic license plate recognition systems should require agencies to 
report statistical analysis of license plate scan data in a fashion similar to Arkansas. 
Much like in Arkansas, Ohio agencies should be required to compile statistical data 
every six months that includes: the number of license plates scanned, the names of 
the lists against which captured plate data were checked, the number of hot list 
matches, the number of hot list matches that were incorrect, and the number of 
matches that resulted in arrest and prosecution. This will aid in holding Ohio law 
enforcement agencies accountable for automatic license plate recognition use and 
promote transparency. The statistical analysis will also display the return on 
investment to both Ohio citizens, whose taxes may be used to pay for these 
machines, and to agencies that spend time and resources training agents to use them. 
If the reported number of incorrect matches is high, it would allow agencies to make 
                                                           
 147  See Va. Att’y Gen, Legality of Collection from Automated License Plate Reader, 2013 
WL 653025, at *4 (Feb. 13, 2013) (Virginia Attorney General’s response to the 
Superintendent of the Virginia Department of State Police regarding whether the Government 
Data Collection and Dissemination Practices Act permits law enforcement agencies to collect, 
maintain, and disseminate LPR data). 
 148  Id. at *1. 
 149  Id. at *3. 
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changes to their procedures, and it will alert the legislature and privacy advocates 
that changes need to be made. 
My second recommendation is that non-hit license plate scan data be deleted 
every three weeks unless it is part of an ongoing investigation, in which case it may 
be retained until the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.150 Given the factual 
differences between Jones, the Ohio case, and the cases just mentioned, three weeks 
strikes a balance between the goals of law enforcement and citizens’ rights while 
managing to mesh well with my other recommendations. Further, three weeks would 
not interfere with the statistical analysis mentioned above since only data 
representing correct or incorrect matches is required and this data is recorded 
instantaneously. This data also avoids the potential mosaic theory and data mining 
problem because it does not require storing the location of the scans but only 
requires the amount of correct or incorrect scans. In addition, the amount of times 
that a person passes a police car with a scanner in three weeks is not enough to paint 
a vivid picture “of a person's public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about 
her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations” which was a 
concern of Justice Sotomayor.151 This would protect suspicionless citizens while still 
furthering law enforcement objectives because it allows police to utilize the 
instantaneous feedback provided by automatic license plate recognition systems to 
apprehend criminals, while protecting innocent citizens from their data being stored 
and mined for future intrusions into their daily behaviors.  
Much like the other statutes, I would recommend that automatic license plate 
recognition cameras be permitted to enforce highway tolls, control access to secured 
areas, and to regulate parking.152 In these instances, as well as with law enforcement 
agencies utilizing these scanners, it should be required that the agencies promulgate 
rules and policies regarding which agency employees have access to the data and the 
ways in which they are to be trained. These policies should be public information. 
This would give citizens information regarding who has access to their sensitive 
information, how they have been trained to handle such information, and how such 
information is protected. 
The last major recommendation I would make is that agencies utilizing this 
technology be prohibited from sharing or selling the data. This prevents other states 
or even Ohio agencies from circumventing the statute by sharing data with larger 
databases and then obtaining access to those databases. These recommendations 
                                                           
 150  In a two-and-a-half week GPS tracking instance in which a device was physically 
placed on a vehicle a state supreme court noted that “when the GPS data was downloaded, it 
provided a record of every place the vehicle had traveled in the past. Sense enhancement 
devices like binoculars and flashlights do not enable officers to determine what occurred in 
the past.” State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 n.2 (Wash. 2003). The same goes for ALPR 
Systems—the downloading of such date provides a record of the vehicle’s travels, unlike 
simple sense enhancement devices. Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals addressed a 
physically attached GPS device over a period of sixty-five days and stated, “It is quite clear 
that this would not and, indeed, realistically could not have been done without GPS . . . .” 
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009). Once again, ALPR systems go 
beyond enhancing a law enforcement officer’s senses allowing the tracking of citizens without 
much effort from law enforcement. 
 151  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 152  See discussion supra Part VI. 
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regulate the rapidly evolving automatic license plate recognition technologies and 
prevent law enforcement agencies from performing an end run around unworkable 
tests created by the courts constitutional interpretation.   
CONCLUSION 
In drafting Ohio’s statutory requirements for the use of automatic license plate 
recognition cameras, the aforementioned cases and statutes provide a helpful drafting 
guide for the Ohio Legislature. The Virginia Attorney General’s advisory opinion 
provides an example of the sort of balance the legislature must try to achieve 
between protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights while still providing law 
enforcement agencies with the technology required to apprehend criminals. The 
recommendations are not entirely inclusive; however, the areas of automatic license 
plate recognition regulation they touch on are crucial: how long the data is stored, 
who has access to such data, how those people have been trained, restrictions on sale 
of the data, and statistical report requirements to promote transparency and public 
oversight. These are the areas the legislature must focus on to curb potential abuse of 
such rapidly changing technological devices. 
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